On September 13, 1759, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., the “most perfect volley ever fired on battlefield” thundered on the Plains of Abraham and crashed into the disorganized line of whitecoats and militiamen only 40 yards away from the thin line of redcoats. Within minutes the French line had broken and was fleeing back to Quebec with the British Army on its heels. The hero, Major General James Wolfe, lay dead on the battlefield and his worthy opponent, Louis Joseph, Marquis de Montcalm, rode into the capital mortally wounded. Neither would live to see the surrender of Quebec and the handing over of the French colony to the British Empire. So ended the long struggle for dominance in North America between France and Great Britain and here began the British history of Canada. At least that is what is taught in elementary history classes. However, there was much more to the Battle of Quebec than what is generally known. The myths and legends which have predominated since that “perfect volley” have become history. While Wolfe has been portrayed as the brilliant British commander and Montcalm as his equal, but defeated, French counterpart, the reality is that both men made grave errors which almost lost the campaign for one and did lose the colony for the other. It was only by good fortune on the part of the British and bad decisions on the part of the French which led to the capture of Quebec and its transferral to the British at the end of the Seven Years War. The mythic proportions given to Wolfe and Montcalm are without foundation and completely inaccurate. If it were not for the mistakes of Montcalm and the apathy at Versailles, the French would have easily won the Battle of Quebec and could have retained New France indefinitely.
The Seven Years War began in 1756 following the French invasion of the Mediterranean island of Minorca, then a British possession, and the Prussian invasion of Saxony. These two events triggered an alliance system which pitted Great Britain, Hanover, and Prussia against France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Saxony. This was, in fact, the first world war as combat took place in the Caribbean, India, all over Europe and North America.
By 1756 fighting had been going on for several years between the French and the British in North America. Colonial rivalry fuelled this conflict and it was especially fierce in the Ohio valley west of the British American colonies. Nevertheless, New France and New England had co-existed uneasily since the early 17th century. By the beginning of the Seven Years War the British colony was home to between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 colonists and was a thriving and profitable British territory. In contrast, New France had between 50,000 and 80,000 colonists who lived predominantly along the St. Lawrence River in isolated communities. The British colonies were almost self-sufficient and would be independent in two decades. The French colony was wholly dependent on it’s mother country for survival.
British strategy for the campaign in North America was centred on the capture of the two strongest fortresses the French possessed: Quebec and Louisbourg. Disastrous British campaigns in the Ohio valley, the Great Lakes region, and New York saved the French colony before 1759. In 1758, however, Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island was captured after a relatively short siege and with no major battle, and the stage was set for the British invasion of New France the following summer. However, the capture of Quebec would not be so easy.
The French were confident in the interior of the continent. “While the English,” Frank Brecher writes, “had demonstrated the ability to conquer French coastal territory...the tremendous natural difficulties of deeper penetrations seemed to have made the French impregnable along the St. Lawrence.” The French shared this belief and were overly-confident that they could repel any British invasion into the interior. Quebec was considered the greatest fortification in North America and it was well known that any invasion force would have to capture the city before the onset of winter, when the St. Lawrence would freeze and any invasion fleet would be trapped and annihilated. Thus, the British realized the difficulties facing them and prepared accordingly. However, while Quebec was in an ideal position, it was not as impregnable as the French believed and so this led to over-confidence and unpreparedness. The administration of the colony only made the defense of Quebec more difficult as “New France suffered from administrative lethargy, venality, and hubris - all of which eventually came to dominate the colony in its crucial final period.”
More important than the administration at Quebec was the administration at Paris and Versailles. In addition to corruption in government, France pursued a dangerous policy towards Great Britain. Brecher writes that “official corruption for private economic gain, unreasonable confidence in overly aggressive policies that could only lead to disastrous wars with the English, and the placing of personal loyalty above professional criteria in making personnel decisions served to create an intolerable situation.” Especially in terms of Great Britain, France was wholly unprepared for war with that power and had not attempted to find any peaceful resolution to their quarrels. It should also be mentioned, for the importance it meant to New France, that Great Britain had the best navy in the world and strove to maintain this level of superiority. France, on the other hand, did not. This would have grave consequences in Quebec when many people died of starvation because of the British blockade.
In addition to a general corruption at home and unpreparedness for war the French government did very little for her colony in North America. Her colonies in the Caribbean were favoured. There were twice as many colonists in the French West Indies than there were in New France, not to mention the larger profits to be found in that sugar-producing area. While Guadalupe was accessible year-round, New France was “literally frozen out of all outside economic activity from November to April.” Not only were the West Indies favoured, but New France was treated as an unimportant annoyance compared to the needs of France itself. France was in the business of fighting a continental war in Europe. It did not feel that New France was a priority. Berryer, Minister of Marine, said to Brigadier Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, an officer of Montcalm, that “on ne cherche point sauver les curies quand le feu est la maison.” In any case, by the later stages of the war, France was in such economic shambles that it could do very little to help. Choiseul, the dominant minister in France, wrote in 1762 that he was not an adherent of “the former policy of having many colonies. I am the sworn enemy of the American policy, because I think it pernicious to France.” The low priority placed on New France led to a lack of support for the colony’s financial state and it’s defense. Brecher describes the French policy for North America:
"The French authorities recognized that the longer the fighting lasted in North America, the bleaker were New France’s prospects for survival. This recognition is evident in a representative strategy document prepared in 1756 by the Ministry of War, which planned for no near-term initiatives in America, where the French posture was seen as necessarily “defensive,” because of England’s ability to attack there on several fronts. Nor did that ministry plan to reinforce New France’s land troops beyond the 1,100 who would arrive there in the spring with General Montcalm."

One example of the French government refusal to aid New France was Bougainville’s trip to France before the start of the 1759 campaign. He asked for 1,000 troops and received Berryer’s reply noted above. The French were left to defend the entire colony with 3,800 regular army soldiers while Wolfe’s expedition numbered around 9,000 and this in addition to the British forces in British America. Upon Bougainville’s return from France just before the arrival of Wolfe, “the stage was now set for the downfall of the colony, which had basically just been told by the mother country to hold out to the end for the good of France, which itself would be unable to make even a marginal effort to provide any measurable support.”
The narrative of the battle is very well known. Wolfe arrived in July 1759 and promptly established bases on Point Levis and on the east bank of the Montmorency River. During the summer Wolfe attempted several times to establish his forces on the north shore of the St. Lawrence and capture Quebec. All attempts were unsuccessful and the city was subjected to a bombardment which left most of Quebec in ruins. However, on the night of 12-13 September Wolfe directed his forces to l’Anse au Foulon where they scaled the cliffs, overwhelmed the small guard commanded by Capitaine Vergor, and assembled on the Plains of Abraham with approximately 4,500 soldiers. Montcalm, worried that the British may entrench themselves, assembled his forces, which numbered approximately 4,000 - 4,500, left the protection of the city walls, and ordered an attack on the British line. The French forces marched towards the British but soon became confused and disorganized. After firing some unsteady volleys at a far range, the French continued to approach Wolfe’s position until the order to fire was given. After two volleys, the French were broken and were fleeing back to Quebec. The British were prevented from entering the city by a skilful rearguard action conducted by the Canadian militia. Wolfe was mortally wounded and died on the battlefield while Montcalm died later that night from a wound he had suffered in the battle. Within a few days, Quebec was surrendered to the British and the fortunes of New France were dashed. This was the Battle of the Plains of Abraham.
This victory was heralded in Great Britain. Wolfe was made into a gallant hero and martyr for the British cause. In his speech, Prime Minister “Pitt lamented the death of the victorious young general at the height of his glory,” creating the Wolfe legend. The Monitor proclaimed that “Carthage may boast of her Hannibal, and Rome may decree triumphs to her Scipio, but true courage never appeared more glorious than in the death of the British Wolfe.” This legend would persist to the 21st century, and Wolfe is generally recognized as a brilliant strategist who won Canada for the British through his bravery and cunning. This will be shown to be false.
Legend would not escape Montcalm. In France Montcalm is also taught to have been a brilliant military commander of the French Army. “Montcalm, disent-ils, demeure, par sa haute moralit , son nergie, sa belle humeur constante dans le p ril, son admirable d fense du Canada, l’une des plus attachantes figures de notre histoire.” Even Charles de Gaulle “pla ait Montcalm l’ gal de Jeanne d’Arc et de Bertrand de Guesclin.” Although Montcalm is remembered with fondness by many Quebecois, the majority have not believed in the Montcalm legend. His legend will also be shown to be false.
Canadians and Britons alike know the victory at Quebec. Canadians, Britons, and Frenchmen may also be familiar with the legends, so much so that they are believed to be historical fact. However, the reality is quite different. Wolfe’s legend has portrayed him as a brilliant commander, but in fact he was not. “Thirty-seven thousand men, equipped with enormous quantities of war material, would be engaged in the operation,” writes Guy Fr gault, “and yet that formidable war machine functioned badly and in relation to its strength gave very poor results. In Wolfe’s hands it seemed heavy, slow, awkward. Not that he was too careful of it; on the contrary he pushed it about, forced it, mishandled it. It creaked and balked and came very close to breaking down completely.” C. P. Stacey wrote that his “performance as a strategist before Quebec during July and August 1759 was sadly ineffective.” Historians like Fr gault and Stacey are not alone in their condemnation of Wolfe’s command. His own subordinates shared this sentiment. Brigadier General Charles Townshend, commanding 2nd Brigade, “confided to his wife his opinion that Wolfe’s tactics were no better than his health, which was bad.” Wolfe’s ‘brilliant’ plan to ascend l’Anse au Foulon could have easily ended in disaster as well. There were many other possible landing areas with much less risk. “The general had taken the crazy risk,” writes Fr gault, “of challenging a stronger enemy without assuring an avenue of retreat for his own forces; if he had lost the battle, his army would have been annihilated.” A retreat to the south and down the cliffs to the St. Lawrence would have been disastrous, a retreat to the north and away from Wolfe’s supporting fleet would have meant the eventual destruction of his army, and a retreat to the west would have put Wolfe directly into the hands of the advancing Bougainville. Wolfe’s gamble, although it bought him victory, could have easily cost the lives of his 4,500 soldiers.
Desmond Morton put it best when he wrote that “Wolfe’s great luck lay not in getting up to the Plains of Abraham but in Montcalm’s furious reaction.” While Wolfe was lucky, it was the mistakes of Montcalm and other French officers which led to the surrender of Quebec, despite what his legend may say. These mistakes could have been easily avoided. Perhaps Montcalm’s first mistake was to let the British take Point Levis without any serious opposition. Point Levis, directly opposite Quebec, was the ideal spot to set up a battery to bombard the city. Wolfe did just that, landing 3,000 men under Brigadier General Robert Monckton. The landing was opposed by Canadian militia but they could not prevent the capture of Point Levis, which Montcalm deemed not worthy of serious defense. According to Fr gault, “there was some murmuring...in the army at this inaction.” Also, “in spite of the most palpable proof” Montcalm could not be convinced that the British force was less than the 20,000 he envisioned. In fact, the British force was less than half that number. Montcalm himself did not have a “belle humeur constante” but was actually defeatist throughout the campaign. Returning to Fr gault, “deep down Montcalm felt that he was engaged in a lost cause...One can see that from the first days of the siege he was expecting defeat.” While the French may rank Montcalm with the best the French military has had to offer, the learned Canadian opinion is quite different. As written in a combined effort by the Universities of Toronto and McGill:
"Ses intrigues...ses critiques ouvertes et parfois calomnieuses l’endroit du gouverneur Vaudreuil et des Canadiens, son refus de reconna tre le m rite des tactiques autres que celles employ es en Europe, son d faitisme chronique, tout a contribu susciter des difficult s et miner le moral des troupes...Il n’etait qu’un produit d’un syst me militaire d suet...Il en tait m me la personnification."

The majority of the French mistakes and those especially of Montcalm took place during the battle itself. On the night of 12-13 September, Vergor’s post was overwhelmed by Wolfe’s forces. However, this was not because of the skill of the British. Vergor was unprepared for this assault and had relaxed his guard. If his post had been adequately watched, the shots fired in the skirmish would have alerted Montcalm during the night of the British approach from the west. Nevertheless, the situation on the morning of 13 September when Montcalm was on the field was very favourable for the French. “All was not lost if the game were played well,” wrote Fr gault. “Bougainville was behind the invading army with his corps of picked troops. Vaudreuil was bringing up reinforcements. The town was defended by a garrison and by cannon.” Montcalm, however, did not wait for these reinforcements - and this will be examined further - and began the attack. Another of Montcalm’s mistakes appeared here. Montcalm wrote that he “will not employ [Canadian militia] except in their own territory” and that those colonial troops “behaved very indifferently at the 1758 victory at Fort Carillon.” Despite his disdain for soldiers from the colony, Montcalm nevertheless incorporated militiamen into his regular French battalions. During the march towards the British line Montcalm paid for this mistake. Malartic, a Frenchman present at the battle, wrote that during the advance “we had not gone twenty paces when the left was too far in rear and the centre too far in front.” This disorganization had a direct influence on the course of the battle. European-style engagements like this one depended on organization for victory.
As noted above, Montcalm did have reinforcements available. Major General, Chevalier de Levis was up river with 800 soldiers. The Governor General of New France, Marquis de Vaudreuil, could have brought up to 7,500 men from the Beauport lines east of the city and from the city itself, and although these would have been irregulars, they would have certainly made a difference. More significant were Bougainville’s 3,000 men near Cap Rouge. Bougainville’s corps was made up of the “best troops in the French army” and was, more importantly, to the rear of the British. Together with Montcalm’s 4,000 - 4,500 men, the French could have fielded over 15,000 soldiers, including almost 4,000 to the rear of the British line, to face Wolfe’s 4,500 men. This would have surely meant victory for the French and destruction for the British. Montcalm, though, would not wait two to three hours for these reinforcements for fear that the British would entrench. However, “the terrain occupied by the British army was not suitable for entrenchments.” Also, it is very unlikely that Wolfe’s forces, constantly being fired upon by 1,500 French irregular skirmishers, could have prepared any formidable defensive positions in 180 minutes. Although having three times the number of troops at his disposal, it is more likely that had he waited Montcalm would have had nearer to 10,000 men on the battlefield “with strong artillery support. Co-ordinating his movements with Bougainville he could have caught Wolfe between two fires and cut his lines to pieces. Instead, about ten o’clock he appeared before his troops thinking he could win the victory alone.” All who study the battle agree that Wolfe could have been annihilated. Folign wrote that “Would to God that he had awaited the arrival of M. Bougainville...It is in the opinion of everyone that not a single Englishman would have got back to his boat.” Governor Vaudreuil also believed that Montcalm, who he did not get along with, should have waited. Shortly after the battle he wrote:
"l’avantage que les Anglais avaient eu de forcer nos postes devait naturellement tre la source de leur d faite; mais [que’] il tait de notre int r t de ne rien pr mateur, [qu’] il fallait que les Anglais fussent en m me temps attaqu s par notre arm e, par 1500 hommes qu’il nous tait fort ais de sortir de la ville et par le corps de Monsier de Bougainville, au moyen de quoi ils se trouveraient envelopp s de toutes parts et n’auraient d’autre ressource que leur gauche pour la retraite, o leur d faite serait encore infaillible."

Bougainville’s corps has been said to have been exhausted by marching and counter-marching in following the British fleet up and down the St. Lawrence. However, Bougainville had not moved on 12 September and the fleet had not been active during the few days before the engagement. Thus Bougainville’s corps would have been well rested and able to fight on 13 September. Bougainville in a letter shortly after the battle wrote that “the enemy landed at midnight, I was informed only at 8 o’clock. M. de Montcalm marched against them and considered himself obliged to attack without waiting for me; when I got close enough to come into action, the army had been routed.” Bougainville was stationed at Cap Rouge and could have arrived at the scene of the battle within two or three hours. However, Bougainville is not free from blame. Although he could have made the difference between victory and defeat had Montcalm awaited his arrival, had he not made his own mistakes, the battle may not have even happened. Stacey writes that "he failed to ensure that the posts nearest to the city were duly watchful; he failed to provide adequate communications from those posts to Beauport camp and his own headquarters; he failed to see to it that the posts were warned of the cancellation of the movement of the provision boats on the fatal night of 12-13 September; finally, he failed to observe what was happening that night and to march to counter Wolfe’s action."

Bougainville’s failure to warn the posts of the cancellation of the provision boats, which had originally been planned for that night, made it possible for the French sentries to allow the British to pass after Captain Fraser called out in French. Had this not occurred the boats would not have passed and the firing would have alerted the French army at Quebec. Thus, Bougainville could have had almost as much effect on the battle as did Montcalm.
Now that it has been shown that the French should have been victorious at Quebec, it is necessary to look at what a victory would have meant for New France. Before addressing this topic, however, it should be mentioned that even though the French lost the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, they could have still won the campaign. The majority of the French army was still intact and, including Bougainville’s corps, most of the army had not even taken part in the battle. Had a counter-attack been organized by Vaudreuil in conjunction with Bougainville, the British could have been chased from the field. Even if this was not possible, Quebec need not have surrendered. Even in the case of surrender the French army could have continued its campaign west of the city as the majority of the army managed to cross the St. Charles River and escape. The Canadian population was behind the colonial government, as nearly “15,000 combatants had gathered around their flags to defend Quebec.” A campaign could have been conducted immediately after the battle in 1759 to oust the British from Quebec when they were at their weakest. Instead, the French waited until the following year.
However, returning to the Plains of Abraham, it is necessary to look at what would have happened after a French victory there. Time was running short on the British forces and they were preparing to leave. Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders was worried about the coming winter. British deserters had informed Montcalm that the admiral was worried about being trapped in the St. Lawrence ice. Stacey wrote that “in the event of the French post [at Foulon] being alert and firing, the whole force would have re-embarked and a week later the fleet would have sailed for England.” S guin wrote that the fixed date for the retreat was 20 September. Had Montcalm waited for reinforcements, one week later the British would have left New France. Although the British could have returned the following year, this is debatable and unlikely. Had Quebec survived yet another siege, it is unlikely the British would have had the confidence to try again to take the apparently impregnable fortress. Additionally, sentiment at home was growing weary of the war. “England was beginning to show war-weariness [in 1760]...,” wrote Fr gault, “it was not certain that Britain would agree to launch another grand-scale offensive against the town.” In fact, it is likely that Quebec could have survived the Seven Years War. Even if Montreal and other territories had been captured by the British, holding Quebec would have given France a claim to the colony. It would probably have not been annexed by the British Empire. Actually, Great Britain might have preferred this as “it was no secret even then that the English government had a selfish interest in allowing the French to remain in North America as a constant military threat to, and therefore a political check on, its own American colonies.” Britain was right in believing this, as the removal of the French from North America allowed the Thirteen Colonies to declare their independence 17 years after the fall of Quebec.
Of course, the question remains whether New France could have survived for much longer. The answer is that it could have. The colonies to the south had never been able to capture Quebec despite numerous attempts, and “there was little likelihood that France would have to confront a united, substantial military effort on the part of the enemy. Tensions between London and the colonies, and traditional jealousies among and within the colonies themselves, would probably bar England from being able to make effective use of her widespread dominions.” In addition to this, by the 1780s the French Navy had become strong enough to more than match that of the British. With a fleet to protect her, New France could have thrived.
Despite all of their shortcomings, “the French forces in North America would prove to be more successful than Paris had a right to expect, and for a much longer period of time than the war strategy originally called for.” With a more determined effort in the summer of 1759, the French could have repelled the British invaders and retained hold of Quebec, the one city that would allow New France to survive the peace talks. French relations with the natives, always better than that of the British, and a possible alliance with the new United States could have ensured the indefinite survival of New France as a colony and, perhaps later, an independent French nation on the North American continent. France did abandon New France in her time of need. However, she still performed splendidly and if it were not for the mistakes of a few men on September 13, 1759, she could have came out of the war as still a part of the French Empire. Montcalm and Wolfe were not the heroes they were made out to be. In fact, they were less than adequate commanders for the tasks they had before them. Had a more able man taken command of the French forces in and around Quebec in that fateful summer, the French culture, which continues to thrive but is slowly being whittled down by English assimilation, whether intended or not, could have been a powerful force in North American society. Instead, the French are now the minority in the country that they had founded in 396 years ago.

Works Cited
Brecher, Frank W. Losing a Continent: France’s North American Policy. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998.

Fr gault, Guy. Canada: The War of the Conquest. Trans. Margaret M. Cameron. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Morton, Desmond. A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1999.

S guin, Philippe. Revisiter Montcalm. Montreal: ditions Fides, 2003.

Stacey, C. P. Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle. Ed. Donald E. Graves. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2002.